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In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-
egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-eﬃcient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity
under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with
characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we
can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and
still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. However, if we weaken order preservation to symmetry,
mechanisms that are not welfare-egalitarian exist. We also study upper bounds on deﬁcit and welfare
lower bounds that characterize subclasses of the welfare-egalitarian class.
JEL Classiﬁcations: C79, D61, D63.
Key words: welfare egalitarianism, solidarity, order preservation, egalitarian-equivalence, no-envy, dis-
tributive justice, NIMBY problems, imposition of tasks, allocation of indivisible (public) goods and money,
the Groves mechanisms, strategy-proofness,unanimity, symmetry, fair allocation.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is an extensive literature studying the welfare-egalitarian solutions in the classical bargaining theory
(Kalai, 1977; Thomson, 1983 etc.) and several other settings such as production and exchange economies
(for references, see Gines and Marhuenda, 2000 and Sprumont, 1996). Ginés and Marhuenda (2000), (we
will refer as GM hereafter), study a continuous public good production economy where agents have quasi-
linear utilities. They characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms by focusing on the three key properties
considered by Kalai in characterizing egalitarian solution: Pareto eﬃciency, symmetry (agents with the
same characteristics/preferences should be treated equally), and monotonicity (enlarging the pie to be
shared should not hurt anyone). Ginés and Marhuenda strengthen symmetry by requiring that if everyone
has the same preference, then all of them should have the same welfare (unanimity). They adapt the
monotonicity axiom to their setting under the name solidarity: if some agents raise their valuations of the
public goods (hence, the total surplus to share is bigger), then no one should experience a lower utility. A
similar axiom of solidarity under preference changes was also used in Sprumont (1996). Axioms of solidarity
r e q u i r et h a tr e l e v a n ta g e n t sb ea ﬀected in the same direction when changes occur in variables over which
they have no control. Other types of solidarity axioms such as solidarity under technology, resource, or
population changes have also been used to characterize allocation rules in egalitarian spirit (for instance,
Thomson, 1983; Moulin and Roemer, 1989; Sprumont, 1996; Chen and Maskin, 1999; Moreno-Ternero and
Roemer, 2006). Our characterization of the welfare-egalitarian mechanisms contributes to this literature.
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1Our paper, together with other studies such as Gines and Marhuenda (2000), Chen and Maskin (1999),
and Moulin and Roemer (1989), conﬁrms that the egalitarian mechanisms can be characterized in several
diﬀerent settings by a similar set of axioms consisting of diﬀerent adaptations of the ideas of eﬃciency,
solidarity, and symmetry.
We study welfare-egalitarian rules in the following model with private information. A ﬁnite set of
heterogenous indivisible goods (or bads/tasks) is to be distributed by a center among a ﬁnite set of agents,
when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. An agent’s valuations (costs) for the
sets of indivisible goods (bads) are her private information and incentive compatibility is needed to induce
agents to report their preferences truthfully (strategy-proofness). All objects must be allocated eﬃciently
to maximize total surplus (minimize total cost) (assignment-eﬃciency).A na g e n tc a nb ea s s i g n e de i t h e r
no object, a single object, or more than one object. We are especially interested in cases where agents
have collective rights or responsibilities over the resources and solidarity and fairness of an allocation are
important and ensured by monetary transfers. Examples to our problem include the allocations of ﬁshing or
pollution permits, water entitlements to farmers, community housing, charitable goods and money among
the needy, commonly owned indivisible goods in cooperative enterprises etc. Without loss of generality, we
focus on the allocation of tasks. Examples include the siting problem of noxious facilities among localities1,
imposition of tasks in government requisitions, and eminent domain (government expropriation of private
property).
Although our model is similar to that of GM’s in some aspects such as quasilinear utilities, there
is suﬃcient diﬀerentiation between the two models to bring about diﬀerences in results (see Section 5.2
for a detailed discussion). GM analyze the problem of determining the level of production of inﬁnitely
divisible public goods where transfers ﬁnance the production. Their main result, Theorem 2.9 in GM, is
the characterization of a subclass of welfare-egalitarian mechanisms with Pareto-eﬃciency (i.e. assignment-
eﬃciency and budget-balance), solidarity, and unanimity. This subclass does not contain any strategy-proof
mechanisms since assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness and budget-balance are incompatible (Green
and Laﬀont, 1977). GM show that their characterization no longer holds in a private-goods setting. On
the contrary, as we show in Proposition 5, the axioms in Theorem 2.9 of GM still characterize the welfare-
egalitarian mechanisms in our setting with private consumption of indivisible goods (note that our model
also applies to the siting problem of discrete public goods, see also Yengin, 2011b). This fact illustrates that,
as also indicated by Roemer (1986), diﬀerent economic environments convey diﬀerent economic information
and intuition; hence, the same set of axioms may not characterize the same class of solutions in diﬀerent
settings.
Our main contribution is the introduction of private information and investigating under which fairness
axioms, welfare-egalitarianism is the outcome. Our main result (Theorem 1) characterizes the welfare-
egalitarian mechanisms with assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, solidarity, and order preservation
(a fair ranking axiom).
Since we restrict our attention to assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanisms, we have to let
go of budget-balance. If we could replicate Theorem 2.9 of GM in our model by simply replacing budget-
balance with strategy-proofness, then the only trade-oﬀ the center needs to consider would be between
lack of strategy-proofness of mechanisms in Theorem 2.9 of GM and the lack of budget-balance of the
mechanisms in our Theorem 1. However, as we demonstrate in Example 1, assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-
proofness, solidarity, and unanimity together do not imply welfare-egalitarianism. Even if we strengthen
unanimity to symmetry, we still do not warrant welfare-egalitarianism (Example 2). On the other hand,
our Corollary 1 shows that we can still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class if in Theorem 1, we replace
order preservation with either one of the following two well-known fairness axioms, egalitarian-equivalence
(Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) or, when costs are subadditive, with no-envy (Foley, 1967).
1i.e., Determining which agents will supply what discrete public goods when all agents derive the same beneﬁt but only
the suppliers bear the costs. Taxes and subsidies can facilitate the sharing of total cost. These problems are also known as
“not-in-my-back-yard” (NIMBY) problems. Note that how many or which public goods to be produced is already given, the
only question is which agents will supply the public goods (e.g., which locality will host the noxious facility).
2These novel results are signiﬁcant for illustrating the trade-oﬀs among several equity axioms. Hence,
it is important to understand the ethical meaning of the axioms we consider. We adapt solidarity as a
central fairness requirement. Since preferences are quasilinear over the tasks and money, a change in the
preference of an agent means a change in her cost function. If some agents experience a decrease in the
cost of performing some tasks, then it is good news for the society since the total cost to be shared is
lower. Since agents whose costs remain the same are not personally responsible for this news, they all
should be aﬀected in the same direction, namely, none of them should be hurt by the good news. Agents
whose costs have declined can enjoy a higher utility as long as this does not aﬀect other agents negatively.
Similarly, if costs of some of the agents increase, no agent should enjoy a higher utility by beneﬁting from
the misfortune of the agents whose costs have risen. Solidarity axiom requires this be the case.
As in GM, one can also interpret the decrease in the cost of an agent to perform some tasks as an
increase in the skill of that agent to perform those tasks. An agent whose costs declined, would enjoy
a higher welfare from the same set of assigned tasks. In a sense, her private technology/skill to convert
an assigned bundle into welfare improves after she experiences a decline in her costs. If one holds the
Rawlsian view that agents’ skills are actually a common asset for the society (see, Moulin and Roemer,
1989; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1994), then an improvement in the skill proﬁle of the society is good
news for everyone. Accordingly, solidarity requires that an increase in the skill of an agent does not hurt
anyone in the society and possibly beneﬁts everyone. In this respect, our solidarity axiom resembles skill
monotonicity axiom in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1994).
The fair ranking axiom, order preservation, strengthens symmetry: not only agents with the same
preferences (cost functions) should experience the same welfare level, but if an agent has lower costs then
another agent, then she shouldn’t be penalized for having lower costs (higher skill) and she should not
experience a lower welfare than the other agent. If lower costs are interpreted as higher skill, then order
preservation also conveys the same idea as “limited self-ownership” axiom in Moulin and Roemer (1989)
even though two models are quite diﬀerent. Order preservation counter-balances solidarity by guaranteeing
agents a limited degree of beneﬁt from their own skills. This renders agents a degree of ownership rights
in their own cost functions which, to a certain degree, is in line with the libertarian view that supports
self-ownership of the skills (Nozick, 1974).
Egalitarian-equivalence and no-envy also support the ownership of one’s own preferences while external
world is seen as under the collective ownership of the society. If every agent was assigned the same bundle,
then, the utility diﬀerences of agents would be solely due to the diﬀerences in their cost functions (i.e.,
preferences). If agents are held responsible for their costs (preferences), but not for the heterogeneity in the
resources, then this allocation would be fair according to the liberal-egalitarian theory of justice. Since an
allocation composed of identical bundles may not be feasible, an alternative is to pick a feasible allocation
that is Pareto-indiﬀerent to an identical-bundles allocation (egalitarian-equivalence). Alternatively, one
may argue that collective ownership of external world means granting agents equality of opportunity to
access the collectively owned resources. An allocation is envy-free, if, when presented the common “oppor-
tunity set” consisting of all the bundles comprising this allocation, each agent chooses the bundle that is
intended for her in the allocation. The welfare of an agent only depends on her choice, that is, she is held
responsible for her own preference and private ownership of the self is respected.
Hence, although order preservation, egalitarian-equivalence, and no-envy are logically distinct fairness
notions, they all express diﬀerent aspects of the notion of self-ownership of one’s own preferences. Theorem 1
illustrates that in conjunction with assignment-eﬃciency and strategy-proofness, solidarity is a powerful
requirement that counterbalances each of these self-ownership axioms to the degree that agents end up not
being held responsible for their own preferences, as implied by welfare-egalitarianism.
To summarize, let the center adapt assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness,a n dsolidarity. If the
center wishes to ensure a strong fairness notion, one among order preservation, egalitarian-equivalence, or
no-envy, it would end up with welfare-egalitarian mechanisms. However, if the center weakens the fairness
notion to unanimity or symmetry, then mechanisms other than the welfare-egalitarian ones can be used.
The distinctions between these fairness axioms is important for the center in making ethical trade-oﬀsw h e n
3choosing which mechanism to adapt. Another concern for the center is the trade oﬀ between the amount of
budget-deﬁcit generated and fairness notion imposed. Under assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness,a n d
solidarity, as Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 indicates, there is no reduction in deﬁcit if center replaces order
preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy. However, if the center gives up order preservation for
unanimity or symmetry, an arbitrarily large reduction in deﬁcit is achievable even though the worst-case
deﬁcit remains the same (see, Section 4). Proposition 4 shows that if order preservation is weakened to
unanimity, a certain subclass of the welfare-egalitarian mechanisms Pareto-dominate all others satisfying
assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, solidarity, and a bounded-deﬁcit condition.
The results in Section 4 also illustrate the trade-oﬀ between lower bounds on welfare and corresponding
upper bounds on deﬁcit. The class of deﬁcit upper bounds we consider includes linear functions of the total
cost of an eﬃcient assignment. One particularly intuitive example of this class is the one which requires
total transfer not to exceed the total cost of an eﬃcient assignment. We consider series of welfare lower
bounds parameterized by  ∈ R each welfare bound guarantee that no agent is worse of than the case when
she performs all the tasks and is compensated by an amount  ∈ R These welfare bounds are analogous
to weak social participation constraints. Using these welfare and deﬁcit bounds, we can partition the
class of welfare-egalitarian mechanisms characterized in Theorem 1, and each subclass in this partition is
characterized by a particular upper bound on deﬁcit, a lower bound on welfare, assignment-eﬃciency, and
strategy-proofness (Theorem 2). This characterization does not require the invocation of any additional
fairness axiom. Contrast this result to the following fact: as part of the deﬁnition of their mechanisms, GM
impose bounds on individual transfers and total transfer that are analogous to the welfare lower bounds and
deﬁcit upper bounds we consider. However, these bounds together with Pareto-eﬃciency are not suﬃcient
to characterize welfare-egalitarianism in their model.
I nS e c t i o n2 ,w ep r e s e n tt h em o d e la n dd e ﬁne the mechanisms. In Section 3, we present our main
Theorem. Section 4 examines bounds on budget deﬁcit and welfare. Section 5 presents concluding remarks
and compares our results with the ones in GM. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Let A be the ﬁnite set of tasks, with |A| ≥ 1 and  be typical elements of A There are  ≥ 2 agents, let
 = {12} be the set of  agents. The number of agents may be smaller than, equal to, or greater
than the number of tasks.
Let 2A be the set of subsets of A. Each agent  has a cost function  :2 A → R+ with (∅)=0 .2 We
refer to such a cost function as unrestricted. Let C be the class of all such functions.
If for each  ∈ (2A\∅), ()=
P
∈
({}),t h e n is additive. If for each pair {0} ⊆ 2A with
 ∩ 0 = ∅, ( ∪ 0) ≤ ()+(0),t h e n is subadditive;a n di ff o re a c h{0} ⊆ 2A with
 ∩ 0 = ∅, ( ∪ 0) ≥ ()+(0),t h e n is superadditive. Let C C and Csup be the classes
of additive, subadditive, and superadditive cost functions, respectively. Let C be a generic element of
{CCCCsup} and domain C be the −fold Cartesian product of C
A cost proﬁle is a list  ≡ (1 ) ∈ C where for each  ∈   ∈ C.A c o s t p r o ﬁle deﬁnes an
economy. For each  ∈  let − be the list of the cost functions of the agents in \{} For each 0 ⊆ 
and each  ∈ C let 0 be the restriction of  to 0 : 0 ≡ ()∈0
Let 0 ∈ C be such that for each  ∈  and each  ∈ 2A 0
()=0 
There is a perfectly divisible good we call “money”. Let  denote agent 0s consumption of the good.
We call  agent 0 transfer:i f  0 it is a transfer from the center to ;i f  0 || is a transfer from 
to the center.
2As usual, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
4Agent ’s utility when she is assigned the set of tasks  ∈ 2A (note that  may be empty) and
consumes  ∈ R is
( ;)=−()+
Let A = {(0
)∈ : for each  ∈  0
 ∈ 2A for each pair {} ⊆  0
 ∩ 0





An assignment is a list ()∈ ∈ A A transfer proﬁle is a list ()∈ ∈ R.A n allocation is a list
( )∈ where ()∈ is an assignment and ()∈ is a transfer proﬁle
A mechanism is a function  ≡ () deﬁned over C that associates with each economy an allocation:
for each  ∈ C and each  ∈ , () ≡ (() ()) ∈ 2A × R










In the rest of the paper, unless stated otherwise, the results hold on any domain. Hence, from here on,
let C ∈{CCCCsup}
In our model, there is no restriction on the size of individual or total transfer. Hence, every allocation is
Pareto-dominated by another allocation with higher transfers. On the other hand, since utilities are quasi-
linear, given a cost proﬁle  an allocation that minimizes the total cost is Pareto-eﬃcient for  among all
allocations with the same, or smaller, total transfer. Our ﬁrst axiom requires mechanisms to choose only
such allocations.




Truthful revelation of costs is essential in order to assign tasks eﬃciently. In general, agents can
manipulate the allocation in their favor by misrepresenting their cost functions. The following axiom
requires that mechanisms prevent such misreport (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
Strategy-Proofness: For each  ∈ C each  ∈ ,a n de a c h0
 ∈ C, (();) ≥ ((0
 −);)
The Egalitarian mechanisms, we introduce next, choose, for each economy, an eﬃcient assignment of the
tasks. We work with single-valued mechanisms and assume that each Egalitarian mechanism is associated
with a tie-breaking rule that determines which of the eﬃcient assignments (if there are more than one) is
chosen. Let T be the set of all possible tie-breaking rules and  be a typical element of this set.
Let  ∈ R The transfers of an Egalitarian mechanism have a simple structure: each agent pays the
sum of the costs incurred by the other agents at the eﬃcient assignment chosen by the mechanism and
receives an amount of money equal to 
The Egalitarian mechanism associated with  ∈ R and  ∈ T  :
Let  ≡ ( ) be such that for each  ∈ C (








()) +  (1)
Note that for each  ∈ R the mechanisms in E={}∈T are Pareto-indiﬀerent.T h a t i s , t h e
particular tie-breaking rule used is irrelevant in the determination of the utilities.
Let E ≡ {E}∈R be the class of the Egalitarian mechanisms. The mechanisms in this class equalize
welfare of all agents in each economy:
Welfare-Egalitarianism: For each pair {} ⊆  and each  ∈ C, (();)=(();)
Lemma 1. A mechanism is assignment-eﬃcient, strategy-proof,a n dwelfare-egalitarian if and only if it
belongs to E.
53M a i n R e s u l t s
Suppose some of the agents experience an increase in the cost of performing some tasks. The cost of an
eﬃcient assignment in this new cost proﬁle is at least as much as the original one. This is bad news for
the society. Solidarity calls for that no agent should be better oﬀ after this bad news.
If () ≥ () for each  ∈ 2A we write  ≥  For each 0 ⊆  a n de a c hp a i r{0} ⊂ C,i ff o r
each  ∈ 0 0
 ≥  we write 0
0 ≥ 0
Solidarity: For each 0 ⊆  each pair {0} ⊂  such that 0
0 ≥ 0 and 0




Next, suppose that for each subset of tasks, agent  incurs a cost that is at least as high as what agent
 incurs. If  were assigned a lower utility than ,i tw o u l db ea si f were penalized for having lower costs.
The following property is meant to prevent this situation.
Order Preservation: For each pair {} ⊆  and each  ∈ C such that  ≥ 
(();) ≤ (();)
Order preservation also appears in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) and a similar property appears in
Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz (2004) under the name of “no-competence penalty”.
Order preservation implies symmetry (for each pair {} ⊆  and each  ∈ C such that  = 
(();)=(();)) w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e sunanimity (for each  ∈ C such that  =  for each
{} ⊆  (();)=(();) for each {} ⊆ ).
In Lemmas 4 and 5 in the Appendix, we characterize, among the assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof
mechanisms, the ones that satisfy solidarity and order preservation, respectively.
Next, we present our main Theorem.
Theorem 1. An assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism satisﬁes order-preservation and sol-
idarity if and only if it is welfare-egalitarian.
We can interpret Theorem 1 as follows: if one requires that society not be negatively aﬀected when the
costs of some agents fall (their skills improve) while agents detain a degree of self-ownership of their skills
via order preservation, then under assignment-eﬃciency and strategy-proofness, there is only one possible
welfare distribution for which these requirements are compatible, namely equal-welfare distribution. Note
that as in GM, this result has also a negative interpretation: if the costs of some agents decrease, under
the axioms of Theorem 1, it is not possible that only these agents beneﬁt from the cost decline; all agents
must beneﬁte q u a l l y . 3
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 together imply that the class E of Egalitarian mechanisms is the class of all
mechanisms that satisfy assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, order-preservation and solidarity.
The class E is a sub-class of the well-known class of Groves mechanisms (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971;
and Groves, 1973) due to Lemma 1 and the following result (the proof of Lemma 2 follows from Holm-
ström (1979) since C is convex):
Lemma 2. A mechanism is assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof on C if and only if it is a Groves
mechanism.
For each  ∈  let  be a real-valued function deﬁned over C such that for each  ∈ C  depends
only on − Let  =( )∈ and H be the set of all such 
3The increase in the welfare of each agent is equal to the decline in total cost.
6A Groves mechanism  ≡ ( ) is deﬁned as follows: for each  ∈ C (
 ())∈ is an eﬃcient-







The transfer of each agent determined by a Groves mechanism has two parts. First, each agent pays
the total cost incurred by all other agents at the assignment chosen by the mechanism. Second, each agent
 receives a sum of money (−) ∈ R t h a td o e sn o td e p e n do nh e ro w nc o s t.N o t et h a t = 
where for each  ∈  and each  ∈ C (−)=
Due to the following equation (2), for each  ∈ H the mechanisms in {}∈T are Pareto-indiﬀerent.




It is known that no assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof (i.e., Groves mechanism) balances the
budget. That is total transfer does not add up to a required amount in all economies. Hence, if we require
truthful revelation of the cost functions, we need to pay the price of budget imbalances.
Next, we introduce arguably the two most central fairness concepts in the fair allocation literature.
If agents have equal rights/responsibilities over the resources, one may argue that fairness requires
assigning each agent the same bundle. However, such an allocation composed of identical bundles is
not always feasible due to the heterogeneity of tasks. Still, we can ﬁnd a feasible allocation that is
Pareto-indiﬀerent to an identical-bundle allocation. Egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978)
requires that only such allocations be chosen.
Egalitarian-Equivalence: For each  ∈ C there are a reference set of tasks (which may be empty)
() ∈ 2A and a reference transfer () ∈ R such that for each  ∈ 
(();)=(()();)
Another well-known fairness notion is no-envy (Foley, 1967), which requires that each agent should ﬁnd
her bundle at least as desirable as any other agent’s bundle.
No-Envy: For each pair {} ⊆  and each  ∈ C,
(();) ≥ (();)
Pápai (2003) shows that among assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanisms, none of them is
envy-free on C
 On the subadditive domain C
, she characterizes the envy-free ones.4
Note that egalitarian-equivalence does not imply welfare-egalitarianism. However, all welfare-
egalitarian mechanisms (including the mechanisms in E)a r ea l s oegalitarian-equivalent where the reference
set of tasks is empty for all economies. In general, there is no logical relation between welfare-egalitarianism
and no-envy. However, on the subadditive domain, welfare egalitarianism implies no-envy.
In the following Corollary, we show that, under assignment-eﬃciency and strategy-proofness,w ec a n
combine solidarity with either of these two central fairness notions and still characterize the Egalitarian
mechanisms.
Corollary 1. (i) An assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism is welfare-egalitarian if and only
if it satisﬁes egalitarian-equivalence and solidarity.
(ii) On the subadditive domain, an assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism is welfare-
egalitarian if and only if it satisﬁes no-envy and solidarity.
The compatibility of no-envy and solidarity is not guaranteed in all settings. For instance, in queueing
problems, no assignment-eﬃcient, budget-balanced,a n denvy-free mechanism satisﬁes solidarity (Chun,
2006). Compare this result to ours: the Egalitarian mechanisms are the only assignment-eﬃcient, strategy-
proof,a n denvy-free mechanisms that satisfy solidarity. (Note that we have to forgo budget-balance to
ensure strategy-proofness.)
4Characterization of assignment-eﬃcient, strategy-proof,a n denvy-free mechanisms on the superadditive domain is an open
question.
74 Egalitarian Mechanisms with Bounded Deﬁcits and Welfare
4.1 Upper-Bounds on Deﬁcit
The obvious limitation of Groves mechanisms is that they do not typically balance the budget. However,
this drawback is abated if the center can ensure that the mechanism generates no-deﬁcit (for each  ∈ C P
∈
() ≤ 0) or respects an upper-bound on the budget deﬁcit. In general, this bound can depend on the
economy. Let  : C → R








() is bounded below by −()
Fortunately, not only there are Egalitarian mechanisms that generate bounded deﬁcits, but also among
these mechanisms, we can characterize the ones that are Pareto-dominant5 or that respect welfare-lower-
bounds. These results increase the appeal of Egalitarian mechanisms by mitigating the lack of budget-
balance.









[1]) where for each  ∈ A 
[1] and 
[2] are the ﬁrst and second cost,
respectively, in the ascending order of the costs in {1({}) ({})}. Note that, for instance, if there
are two agents whose cost of performing  are the lowest  then 
[1] = 
[2].






a) An Egalitarian mechanism satisﬁes −bounded-deﬁcit if and only if it belongs to E where  ≤0
b) Among all mechanisms that satisfy assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, solidarity, order-
preservation, and −bounded-deﬁcit, the mechanisms in E0 Pareto-dominate the others and they generate
the minimal surplus.






welfare-egalitarian Groves mechanisms that respect this deﬁcit-upper-bound generate no-deﬁcit (indeed,
generate a surplus of at least ( − 1)()) but also assign agents welfare levels that are not positive.
Another upper bound studied in the literature is −bounded-deﬁcit considered in Ohseto (2006) and




 () ≤ . If this condition is satisﬁed, then the center
knows that the highest amount of deﬁcit it may face in any economy, no matter what the costs of the
a g e n t sa r e ,i saﬁxed amount  Note that, for each  ∈ R the highest possible deﬁcit generated by an





(−)} = −( − 1)min
∈C{()} + 
= (0)+ =  (3)
By (3), the mechanisms in E would satisfy −bounded-deﬁcit for  ≥ 
Next, we introduce the following class of deﬁcit-upper-bounds that are linear functions of the total cost
of an eﬃcient assignment:
M = { : C → R| for each  ∈ C ()=()+ with  ≥− ( − 1) and  ∈ R}
5The mechanism  Pareto-dominates 
0 if for each  ∈ C
 and each  ∈ , (();) ≥ (
0
();) and there are  ∈ C

and  ∈  such that (();)  (
0
();)
8Note that −bounded-deﬁcit with  =0corresponds to −bounded-deﬁcit.6 Also, if  = −1 and
 =0  then −bounded-deﬁcit requires that for each  ∈ C,
P
∈
() ≤− () This requirement is
similar to the one in GM where total payment of agents to the center (i.e. budget surplus) is at least as
much as the total cost. However, in our setting, agents are the ones who incur the costs of tasks, not the
center. If the center is imposing tasks on agents as in eminent domain, then the center should compensate
the costs of the agents. Hence, in such cases, it makes more sense to require that the total compensation




This requirement corresponds to −bounded-deﬁcit with  =1and  =0 
For each  ∈ C the smallest deﬁcit-upper-bound that would be satisﬁed by a mechanism in E is
()= −( − 1)()+ Hence, if a mechanism belongs to E then it satisﬁes −bounded-deﬁcit
as long as  ≥  Proposition 2a shows the “only if” direction is also true. Proposition 2b singles out the
Pareto-dominant class among all welfare-egalitarian Groves mechanisms that satisfy −bounded-deﬁcit.
Proposition 2. Let  ∈ M
a) An Egalitarian mechanism satisﬁes −bounded-deﬁcit if and only if it belongs to E where  ≤

b) Among all mechanisms that satisfy assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, solidarity, order-
preservation, and −bounded-deﬁcit, the mechanisms in E with  = 
 Pareto-dominate the others
and generate the minimal surplus.
4.2 Lower-Bounds on Welfare
Consider the following welfare-lower-bound introduced in Yengin (2011c): imagine, there is only one agent
in the society. Since she is the only one who is responsible for the completion of all tasks, she should bear
all the cost. However, it would be unfair to tax this agent. Call her utility in this reference economy as her
stand-alone utility. In the actual economy, since all agents are responsible for the tasks, no agent should
end up worse than her stand-alone utility where she bore all the costs alone with no compensation.
No-Compensation Lower-Bound7: For each  ∈  and each  ∈ C,
(();) ≥− (A)
A Groves mechanism  satisﬁes no-compensation lower-bound if and only if for each  ∈  and each
 ∈ C
(−) ≥ 0 (4)








(−) ≥− (−1)() Hence, the deﬁcit is
at least −( − 1)() I si tp o s s i b l et oi m p o s ead e ﬁcit-upper-bound greater than −( − 1)() and pin
down for each  ∈  t h ee x a c tv a l u et h a t(−) would take at any  ∈ C? The answer is aﬃrmative if
we impose −bounded-deﬁcit with  =0 
Remark 1. a) A mechanism has the smallest deﬁcit for each economy among all mechanisms satisfying
assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofnes,a n dno-compensation lower-bound if and only if it belongs to E0
b) Let  ∈ M with  =0  A mechanism satisﬁes assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, no-
compensation lower-bound,a n d−bounded-deﬁcit if and only if it belongs to E08
6If we allowed −( − 1) then there would be no welfare-egalitarian Groves mechanism that satisﬁes 
−bounded-
deﬁcit. To see this, let  ∈ R−( − 1) − 0,a n d
 ∈ E
 Suppose for each  ∈ C
, −( − 1)()+ ≤ ()+
Then, 0 ≤ [−(−1)−]() ≤  − Since there is no upper bound on costs, [−(−1)−]() is unbounded above; and
we get a contradiction.
7Y e n g i n( 2 0 1 1 c )r e f e r st ot h i sw e l f a r eb o u n da st h estand-alone-lower-bound.
8Remark 1 (a) and (b) follows from Proposition 3b and Theorem 2, respectively. Remark 1b still holds if we replace

−bounded-deﬁcit with the deﬁc i t - b o u n di nP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
9To characterize other subclasses of E we need to change the strength of the welfare-lower-bound and
deﬁcit-upper-bound imposed in Remark 1b. Consider the following generalization of no-compensation
lower-bound: no agent should be worse oﬀ than the case where she is assigned all the tasks and received a
compensation equal to  ∈ R
−Compensation Lower-Bound: For each  ∈  and each  ∈ C,
(();) ≥− (A)+
Proposition 3. a) A Groves mechanism satisﬁes −compensation lower-bound if and only if for each
 ∈  and each  ∈ C
(−) ≥  (5)
b) A mechanism has the smallest deﬁcit for each economy among all mechanisms satisfying assignment-
eﬃciency, strategy-proofnes,a n d−compensation lower-bound if and only if it belongs to E
For each  ∈ R the mechanisms in E satisfy 0−compensation lower-bound for each 0 ≤  and, by
(3), −bounded-deﬁcit for each  ≥  If these inequalities hold as equalities, then only those Groves
mechanism that belong to E satisfy these two requirements. If we require the upper-bound on deﬁcit to
depend on the economy as in  ∈ M with  6=0 , we still characterize the class E
Theorem 2. Let  ∈ M with  =  A mechanism satisﬁes assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofnes,
−compensation lower-bound,a n d−bounded-deﬁcit if and only if it belongs to E
For any  ∈ M with   there is no Groves mechanism that satisﬁes −bounded-deﬁcit
and the −compensation lower-bound.9 If   mechanisms that do not belong to E or that are not
even welfare-egalitarian, would also satisfy −bounded-deﬁcit and −compensation lower-bound.F o r
instance, let  =  +  for some 0 and consider  which is not welfare-egalitarian:f o r e a c h
 ∈ C, 1(−1)= +  and for each  ∈ \{1} (−)= By (5),  satisﬁes −compensation





 ()=−(−1)()+ Hence,  satisﬁes
−bounded-deﬁcit.
4.3 Weakening Order-Preservation
Consider Groves mechanisms that satisfy solidarity. One may think that the budget deﬁcit generated would
be smaller if we impose order preservation rather than unanimity or symmetry since order preservation
may make it cheaper to extract information from low cost agents. It would be useful to be able to compare
deﬁcits of the two classes of Groves mechanisms, one satisfying solidarity and order-preservation and the
other satisfying solidarity and a weakening of order preservation such as unanimity or symmetry. Such a
comparison would help us understand the trade oﬀ between the amount of budget deﬁcit and the strength
of axiom imposed. However, the result of the comparison of deﬁcits is ambiguous since it depends on cost
proﬁles and which members of the class we pick as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1. Let  ∈ R and  ∈ E Note that  satisﬁes solidarity and order-preservation.
Let 0 ∈ R and  be such that for each  ∈ C 1(−1)=− max
∈\{1}
{(A)}+0 and for each  ∈ \{1}
(−)=− min
∈\{}
{(A)} + 0.N o t e t h a t  satisﬁes solidarity and unanimity but violates welfare-
egalitarianism and symmetry.
9If   then in the economy 
0 a Groves mechanism that satisﬁes −compensation lower-bound, would violate

−bounded-deﬁcit. See (29) in the proof of Theorem 2.










 ()=−() − 1(A) − 2(A)+2 0
Since there is no upper bound on cost functions, −1(A) − 2(A)+2 0 may be greater or smaller than 2
depending on the cost proﬁle. 3
Let U be the class of Groves mechanisms that satisfy solidarity and unanimity and  ∈ U Consider
0 ∈ C Since for each pair {} ⊆  0
 = 0
 by unanimity and (2), there is  ∈ R such that for each
 ∈  (0
−)= Note that for each  ∈ C≥ 0 Hence, by solidarity and (16), for each  ∈  and
each  ∈ C
(−) ≤ (0
−)= (6)
By (6), we can ﬁgure out the maximal possible deﬁc i tt h a ta n ym e c h a n i s mi nU would generate.10
Since (0)=0  for each  ∈ C −( − 1)() ≤− ( − 1)(0). This inequality and (6) together






























By (3), E can be partitioned into subclasses, E = {E}∈R where for each  ∈ R the mechanisms in E
generate deﬁcits up to  =  Similarly, by (7), U can be partitioned into subclasses, U = {U}∈R where
for each  ∈ R the largest possible deﬁcit generated by a mechanism in U is  That is, U is the class
of Groves mechanisms  ∈ U such that  is as in (6).
If the center picks a mechanism from U\E rather than from E then it would be giving up order-
preservation for a weaker axiom unanimity without gaining anything in terms of reducing the maximal
possible budget deﬁcit. Hence, in the worst case scenario, i.e. in economy 0 both classes generate the
same amount of deﬁcit  However, at any other economy  ∈ C\{0} the deﬁcit generated by any
mechanism in E is greater than the deﬁcit of a mechanism in U\E by the amount ∆() ≥ 0 as below:






















hence ∆() can be unboundedly large for some mechanisms  ∈ U\E. For instance, consider  and
10Unfortunately, we do not have the full characterization of the transfer functions of mechanisms in U
11 deﬁn e di nE x a m p l e1a n dl e t0 = . Then, for each  ∈ C, ∆()=1(A)+2(A) which is unbounded
above. Thus, the center can achieve an arbitrarily large reduction in deﬁcit if it gives up order preservation
for unanimity although the worst-case deﬁcit is same for both axioms. Note that even if we strengthened
unanimity to symmetry, the same result holds and the reduction in deﬁcit is unbounded above when we
give up order preservation for symmetry (see the mechanisms in Example 2).
When choosing between a mechanism in U\E versus one in E the reduction in deﬁcit is not the only
concern. While mechanisms in U\E generate lower deﬁcits the mechanisms in E generate higher welfare
levels. By (6), the mechanisms in E Pareto-dominate all mechanisms in U In other words, mechanisms
in E Pareto-dominate all Groves mechanisms that satisfy solidarity, unanimity and −bounded-deﬁcit
where  =  The next result shows that we get the same result if we generalize the deﬁcit-upper-bound
to −bounded-deﬁcit with  =  Hence, in Proposition 2, we can weaken order-preservation to
unanimity and still get the same result.
Proposition 4. a) A mechanism satisﬁes assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofnes, solidarity, unanimity,
and −bounded-deﬁcit if and only if it belongs to U where  ≤

b) Among all mechanisms that satisfy assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, solidarity, unanimity, and
−bounded-deﬁcit, the mechanisms in E with  =
 Pareto-dominate the others.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
5.1 Comments on Section 4
Let us summarize and brieﬂy evaluate the results in Section 4.
By Theorem 2, we obtain a class of Groves mechanisms parameterized by  ∈ R E,w h i c hi st h e
largest class of Groves mechanisms that respect −compensation lower-bound and respect the minimal
deﬁcit-upper-bound that is compatible with −compensation lower-bound (i.e. −bounded-deﬁcit
with  = −( − 1) and  = ) If we raise this deﬁcit-upper-bound by allowing for −( − 1) still
we obtain the same class. One may think that a deﬁcit-upper-bound that depends on the cost proﬁle is
not appealing. However, even if we impose −bounded-deﬁcit with  =  o rr e q u i r et h a tt h ed e ﬁcit is
minimal among all Groves mechanisms satisfying −compensation lower-bound (Proposition 3b), we still
characterize the same class. Also, by Proposition 2b, the mechanisms in E Pareto-dominate all Groves
mechanisms that satisfy solidarity, order-preservation, and −bounded-deﬁcit with  =  This result
does not change if we weaken order-preservation to unanimity (Proposition 4b).
Some remarks are in order regarding Theorem 2:
First, our Theorem 2 and Proposition 3b are similar to Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 of Atlamaz and
Yengin (2008) who also characterize a parameterized class of Groves mechanisms by imposing a lower-
bound on welfare and a corresponding upper bound on deﬁcit. These bounds on deﬁc i ta n dw e l f a r ea r e
diﬀerent than the ones we considered in Theorem 2.
Secondly, as in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008), Theorem 2 also indicates a trade-oﬀ between level of agents’
welfare and the amount of surplus generated. As  increases, agents are guaranteed higher levels of welfare;
however, the upper bound on deﬁcit also increases (i.e. lower bound on surplus decreases). In Theorem 2,
if  =0 then the mechanism respects no-compensation lower-bound and generates no-deﬁcit. If  0 then
in some economies, the center may incur deﬁc i td e p e n d i n go nt h ec o s tp r o ﬁle. If  0 then the mechanism
always generates a budget surplus, however the agents experience negative utilities. Such a mechanism
that always taxes agents may be desirable to use in the event of a national emergency such as a war or
natural disaster. In such cases, governments impose tasks on civilians (government requisition ) as well as
taxing them.
Thirdly, Theorem 2 provides an alternative characterization of the Egalitarian mechanisms. Under
assignment-eﬃciency and strategy-proofness, even if we do not resort to fairness axioms of Theorem 1 or
12Corollary 1, by just requiring that a mechanism respects appropriate bounds on deﬁcit and welfare, we end
up with welfare-egalitarian mechanisms.
We should also remark that the class E0 stands out among all Egalitarian mechanisms as indicated by
Proposition 1b and Remark 1 Note that by Remark 1b, the only class of Groves mechanisms that generate
no-deﬁcit and satisfy no-compensation lower-bound is E0. Also, Proposition 2 implies the following:
The mechanisms in E0 Pareto-dominate all welfare-egalitarian Groves mechanisms that satisfy any one
of the following:
(i) no-deﬁcit (i.e.  =  =0 ) , or
(ii) for each  ∈ C,
P
∈
() ≤− () (i.e.  = −1) or
(iii) for each  ∈ C,
P
∈
() ≤ () (i.e.  =1 )  or
(iv) for each  ∈ C,
P
∈
() ≤ () where  ≥− ( − 1)
Propositions 1a and 2a together imply an interesting result: the class of Egalitarian mechanisms that
satisfy the bounded deﬁcit condition in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) is the same as the class of Egalitarian
mechanisms that satisfy −bounded-deﬁcit with  =0  Hence, we may limit the deﬁcit of an Egalitarian





[1]) or with () where  ≥− (−1) and still end up
w i t ht h es a m ec l a s si nb o t hc a s e s  As an example, let there be a single task and an Egalitarian mechanism
is to be used. Suppose the center considers allowing deﬁcit up to one of the following three upper bounds:
(i) the diﬀerence between second minimal and minimal cost (
[2] − 
[1]) (ii) twice the minimal cost (i.e.
() with  =2 ), and (iii) 10 times the minimal cost (i.e. () with  =1 0 ). Then, it does not matter
which upper bound the center adopts, the resulting Egalitarian mechanism must be in E where  ≤0 and
generate no-deﬁcit, even if the center allows for a positive budget deﬁcit.
Similarly, by Remark 1b, even if the center allowed a positive deﬁcit (i.e. 0) as long as  =0 
the mechanisms that respect −bounded-deﬁcit and no-compensation lower-bound would generate no-
deﬁcit.
5.2 Comparison of our Results with the Related Literature
Our model and results are related to the ones in GM. Below we present remarks about the diﬀerences in
our settings and results.
In GM, a set of agents needs to determine the level of production of  divisible public goods and what
the payments of agents are for ﬁnancing the production. Each agent ’s valuation for a vector of public
goods  ∈ R
+ is () ∈ R Agent 0 utility is (;)=()+  +  where  is ’s endowment
of money. The cost of producing  ∈ R
+ is () ∈ R+. GM introduce the following mechanism that
chooses ∗ ∈ argmax(
P
∈
() − ()) (assignment-eﬃciency) and determine the payments (−)∈
of agents such that −
P
∈





(∗) − (∗)]. Since the mechanism equates agents’ utilities net of endowments, lets refer to it
as Net-welfare-egalitarian mechanism.
The following three points outline the crucial diﬀerences between our models.
•GM1: In GM, there are  inﬁn i t e l yd i v i s i b l ep u b l i cg o o d st ob ep r o d u c e dand transfers ﬁnance the
production. In our model, there is a ﬁxed set of indivisible tasks to be allocated and monetary transfers
are for compensating the agents.
•GM2: In GM, each  has an endowment  whereas in our model, we implicitly assume that each agent
is capable of paying an unbounded amount of money. In GM, a mechanism is deﬁned so that each agent’s
13payment is bounded above by her endowment. Note that an upper bound on the payment implies a lower
bound on the transfer and welfare of the agent. In our model, we impose no lower bound on the transfers
as part of the deﬁnition of a mechanism.
•GM3 : In GM, a mechanism is deﬁned so that the total payment must be at least as much as () In
our model, we do not impose any upper bound on total transfer as part of the deﬁnition of a mechanism.
Theorem 2.9 in GM states that the Net-welfare-egalitarian mechanisms are the only Pareto-eﬃcient
(i.e. assignment-eﬃcient and budget-balanced) mechanisms satisfying solidarity and unanimity. Note
that these mechanisms are not strategy-proof, hence, are not Groves mechanisms. On the other hand,
Egalitarian mechanisms are assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof but not budget-balanced. Hence, GM
and our paper characterize two disjoint subclasses of the class of welfare-egalitarian mechanisms.
Since our results are related to GM’s, one may wonder why we chose to study our model and why we
might expect results to be diﬀerent than GM.
We chose to work in the task-allocation environment studied in several papers such as Porter et al
(2004) and Moulin (2009); and our results here complement the ones in Yengin (2010, 2011abc). Our
results can also be easily adapted to the problem of allocating desirable indivis i b l eg o o d sa si na u c t i o n s
(see Pápai 2003, for the counterpart of our model in that setting). The task allocation setup, not only
is interesting in terms of real life examples, but also allows for the analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent cost
structures on the results. When it comes to allocating objects with Groves mechanisms, the type of the
domain, in general, alters the characterizations considerably:
In Yengin (2011b), we consider Groves mechanisms that respect the identical-preferences-lower-bound;
and the structure of the transfers characterized on the unrestricted domain diﬀers from the ones character-
ized on the subadditive domain. Pápai (2003) shows that there is no envy-free Groves mechanism on C

but they exist on C
 Also, in general, characterizing Groves mechanisms on the superadditive domain
is either technically or notationally complex, hence, not studied.11 Hence, it is surprising and good news





as well as in the single-task case or the homogenous-tasks case (for each agent, all tasks cost the same).
Our proofs work in each of these domains due to Lemma 3. Moreover, the transfers of the characterized
Groves mechanisms have the same structure, i.e. they are as in equation (1), in all of these domains. The
independence of our characterizations from the type of domain may make the Egalitarian mechanisms even
more appealing. On the other hand, this independence also means that greater restrictions on the cost
functions would not provide the mechanism designer more ﬂexibility in insisting on order-preservation and
solidarity without mandating welfare-egalitarianism.
Even though our paper is related to GM, there is suﬃcient diﬀerentiation between the two models to
expect diﬀerences in some of the results since even in the task allocation problem, slight diﬀerences in
model would change the results.12 Below three points contrast our results with GM’s:
First of all, whereas we present our characterizations in a setting with privately consumed ob-
jects/privately supplied tasks, GM’s characterization only holds in the public good setting.
GM state that the fact that the agents coordinate on the production plan of a common level of public
good using a common technology is crucial in their Theorem 2.9. When agents produce and consume private
goods, they show that a Pareto-eﬃcient mechanism may satisfy solidarity and unanimity and yet does not
have to be welfare-egalitarian even if all agents had the same endowment. By changing the speciﬁcations
of the model from GM to ours, we recover the level of cooperation needed to secure welfare-egalitarianism
11Papers analyzing Groves mechanisms generally restrict attention to either the single-object case and to the additive domain
(Porter et al. 2004; Atlamaz and Yengin, 2008), or to the allocation of homogenous objects where each agent can receive at
most one object (Ohseto, 2006; Moulin, 2009, Serizawa forthcoming), or to the subadditive domain (Pápai, 2003).
12For instance, Serizawa (forthcoming) study the allocation of indivisible homogenous goods where each agent can receive at
most one object and similar to GM2, the payment of each agent is bounded below by zero. On the other hand, Papái (2003)
analyze the same setting as our paper here. Serizawa shows that the only individually rational (no agent should experience
a negative utility) and envy-free Groves mechanisms are the Pivotal mechanisms where as Papái (2003) shows that there are
many other such mechanisms.
14even if agents undertake the tasks privately. Instead of the need to coordinate on the production of a
common level of public good, our agents need to coordinate on sharing a ﬁxed set of discrete goods. Hence,
our model answered the open question of when cooperation is still needed and would warrant welfare-
egalitarianism even in private goods economies. The fact that the set of tasks is already given, i.e. the
absence of the need to determine the level of production of the objects is crucial.
Note that our model can also be applied to problems where agents privately supply discrete public goods
(see Yengin, 2011b, for more details). Assume that there is no question of whether or how much of each
public good is to be provided (e.g., building a waste disposal site, siting state capitals). The only question
is which agent (locality) will provide (produce/host) what public goods and what the compensations are.
Here, each agent produces her assigned set of discrete public goods using her private technology but all
agents beneﬁt from all the supplied public goods equally. Agents bear the costs privately and center uses
transfers to compensate the agents. A related application of the model to the production of multi-attribute
public goods is also presented in Section 4 in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008).13
The next result, Proposition 5, is the counterpart of Theorem 2.9 of GM, however, we need a much
simpler proof. This result shows that if we require budget-balance instead of strategy-proofness,t h e r ei s
still enough coordination in our model to warrant welfare-egalitarianism.N o t et h a tt ob ea b l et oi n v o k e
Pareto-eﬃciency, we need a condition parallel to GM3. Hence, let us consider the class of mechanisms







Proposition 5. Consider the class of mechanisms that satisfy (8). A Pareto-eﬃcient mechanism satisﬁes
solidarity and unanimity if and only if it is welfare-egalitarian.14
Secondly, besides studying a diﬀerent setup, we also introduce private information. Due to the require-
ment of strategy-proofness, our proofs and the mechanisms we characterize are entirely diﬀerent than the
ones in GM. Hence, introduction of strategy-proofness brings about substantial changes to the results. If
we could replicate Theorem 2.9 of GM in our model by simply replacing budget-balance with strategy-
proofness, then the only trade-oﬀ the center needs to consider would be between lack of strategy-proofness
of GM’s mechanisms and the lack of budget-balance of our Egalitarian mechanisms. However, as the mech-
anism  in Example 1 demonstrates, assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness, solidarity, and unanimity
together do not imply welfare-egalitarianism. Even if we strengthen unanimity to symmetry,w es t i l ld o
not warrant welfare-egalitarianism as the next example shows:
Example 2. Let  ∈ R≥ 0 and  be such that for each  ∈ C and each  ∈  (−)=
−(−)+ Note that  is not welfare-egalitarian but it satisﬁes assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-
proofness, solidarity, and symmetry (hence, unanimity). 3
Comparison of Theorem 2.9 of GM and our Theorem 1 shows that in order to characterize Egalitarian
mechanisms, we need to invoke a stronger notion of self-ownership of one’s own preferences than the one
in GM by strengthening unanimity to order-preservation. The next obvious question is whether strategy-
proofness and order-preservation can replace budget-balance and unanimity and still characterize some
form of egalitarianism in the GM public good production framework. Our conjecture is that if all agents
have the same level of endowment and we drop requirements in GM2 and GM3, then proof of Theorem 1
could be easily adapted to GM model. However, it is an open question whether Theorem 1 would still hold
in GM model with endowments or with production of private goods.
13Suppose tasks are to be assigned to some agents and all the agents beneﬁt from the performance of the tasks independently
of the identities of the agents who are assigned the tasks. A task may have diﬀerent attributes/qualities, and each attribute
may have diﬀerent levels. If an agent is assigned the task, there is an optimal quality level speciﬁc to her, which maximizes
the social surplus (i.e., the sum of the beneﬁts agents derive from the tasks minus the cost of performance of the tasks).
14Note that the proof only works with the deﬁcit upper bound in (8) .
15Thirdly, requirements in GM2 and GM3 together with Pareto-eﬃciency are not enough to imply welfare-
egalitarianism in GM. In contrast, in our model, under assignment-eﬃciency and strategy-proofness, bounds
on welfare and deﬁcit that are parallel to GM2 and GM3 are suﬃcient to imply welfare-egalitarianism
(Remark 1b). Note that −bounded-deﬁcit with  =1and  =0c o n v e y st h es a m ei d e aa si nG M 3 .
A l s o ,G M 2i si nt h es a m es p i r i to fno-compensation lower-bound: if an agent ’ sp a y m e n ti sn om o r et h a n
her endowment, then (;) ≥ () for any  ∈ R
+ One can think of () as ’s stand-alone or
worst-case welfare where  spends all her endowment to ﬁnance . Hence, both GM2 and no-compensation
lower-bound guarantees agents a welfare no less than their stand-alone welfare levels.
The mechanisms in E appear to be also appealing alternatives to the Pivotal mechanisms15 which
violate some important fairness axioms such as egalitarian-equivalence, solidarity, −bounded-deﬁcit,a n d
population monotonicity (as population decreases, no one beneﬁts, see Yengin, 2011c). On the other hand,
we can design Egalitarian mechanisms that satisfy all of these axioms. Mechanisms in E are also anonymous,
order preserving, and as we prove in a companion paper, (Yengin, 2011a), on the subadditive domain, are
the only envy-free, egalitarian-equivalent, assignment-eﬃcient, and strategy-proof mechanisms. Hence,
they satisfy several diﬀerent fairness and solidarity requirements as well as generating bounded deﬁcits
and respecting welfare-lower-bounds. These results reinforce the importance of the class E in the economic
setting we study.
6A p p e n d i x
The proof of Theorem 1 uses the following Lemmata. We stated in Lemma 2, that the only assignment-
eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanisms are the Groves mechanisms. In Lemma 1, we prove that the class
E is the class of assignment-eﬃcient, strategy-proof,a n dwelfare-egalitarian mechanisms. In Lemma 4,
we characterize the class of assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanisms that satisfy solidarity.I n
Lemma 5, we characterize the class of assignment-eﬃcient, strategy-proof, and order preserving mecha-
nisms.
Lemma 1. A mechanism is assignment-eﬃcient, strategy-proof, and welfare-egalitarian if and only if it
belongs to E.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
Let  ∈ E Note that  =  where for each  ∈  and each  ∈ C (−)= Hence, by
Lemma 2,  is assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof.B y( 2 ) ,f o re a c h ∈ C and each pair {} ⊆ 
(

 ();)=−()+ = (

 ();) Hence,  is welfare-egalitarian.
Conversely, pick an assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism that is welfare-egalitarian. By
Lemma 2, this mechanism is a Groves mechanism  for some  ∈ H and  ∈ T  Then, by welfare-
egalitarianism and (2), for each  ∈ C and each pair {} ⊆ 
(−)=(−) (9)
We will show that for each pair {0} ⊂ C and each  ∈ 
(−)=(0
−) (10)
Let {0} ⊂ C Let  :  → {12} be a bijection For each  ∈ {01} let  ∈ C be such
that for each  ∈  with () ≤  
 =  and for each  ∈  with ()   
 = 0
 Note that for each




− ) This equality and
(9) together imply that for each  ∈ {1} and each  ∈  (
−)=(−1
− ) This implies that for
15Also known as, Vickret mechanisms, Clarke mechanisms, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, Second-price sealed-bid
auctions.
16each  ∈  (
−)=(−1
− )= = (1
−)=(0
−) These equalities and the facts that  =  and
0 = 0 together imply (10). By (9) and (10), there exists  ∈ R such that for each  ∈  and each  ∈ C
(−)= and  =  ¥
We need the following notation for the next proofs:
Deﬁnition 1. For each  ∈ (2A\∅) let ()={1 2 } be a partition of  into  ≤ || non-empty
subsets. That is, for each pair {0 00} ⊆ () 0 ∩ 00 = ∅ and ∪
0∈()
0 = .
Let P() ≡ {():() 6= {}} be the set of all partitions of  except for the partition {}
For each {0} ⊂ C and each  ∈  let b  be such that













The following Example illustrates the calculation of (11).
Example 3. Suppose A = {},  = {} and {0} ⊂ C The following table presents 0 and
the corresponding b 
{} {} {} {} {} {} A
 10 5 9 7 18 13 21
 7 6 8 13 14 16 30
0
 3 6 11 9 18 18 21
0
 9 7 10 15 17 12 33
b  3 5 8 7 11 12 15
Table 1
To see how b  is calculated, consider  = {} T h e r ea r et w ow a y st op a r t i t i o n : ()={{}{}}
and 0()={} Here, P()={()} and
P
0∈()




()} =7 8 by (11) b ()=7  3
In Lemma 3, we show that for each C ∈{CCCCsup} each pair {0} ⊂ C and each  ∈  b 
is in the same domain as  and 0
Lemma 3. For each C ∈{CCCCsup} each pair {0} ⊂ C and each  ∈  let b  be as in (11).
Then, b  ∈ C
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :
Let {0} ⊂ C,  ∈  and b  be as in (11). Note that b  is additive i fa n do n l yi ff o re a c h ∈ 2A and




a) Suppose C ∈ {CC} By (11) for each  ∈ 2A with || ≥ 2






By (12), b  is either additive or subadditive Hence, b  ∈ C
b) Suppose C ∈ {CC} By (12), b  is either additive or subadditive. We will show that b  must be
additive which would imply that b  ∈ C.






P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :Suppose that the claim is not true. Then, by (12), for some ∗ ∈ 2A with |∗| ≥ 2






By (11) and (13), b (∗)=m i n
∈
{(∗) 0















By (14), there exists 0 ∈ (∗) such that (0)  b (0) This inequality contradicts the fact that for
each  ∈ 2A b () ≤ min
∈
{() 0
()} Hence, Claim 1 must be true. 3
For each  ∈ {12|A|} let Λ = { ∈ 2A : || = } be the set of subsets of A with  elements.




P r o o fo fC l a i m2 :Proof is by induction on 




Step 2: Let  ∈ Λ2 Since P()={()} where ()={{0}{00}} and  = {0 00} (see Example 3)























Induction Hypothesis: Let  ∈ {34|A|} For each 0 ∈ {12− 1} and each  ∈ Λ0
 let b ()= P
∈
b ({})











b ({}) Then, by




By Claim 2, for each  ∈ (2A\∅) b ()=
P
∈
b () that is, b  is additive and b  ∈ C ¥
Next, we characterize mechanisms that satisfy assignment-eﬃciency, strategy-proofness,a n dsolidarity.
B yL e m m a2 ,E q u a t i o n( 2 ) ,a n dsolidarity, for each 0 ⊆  each pair {0} ⊂  such that 0
0 ≥ 0
and 0
\0 = \0 and each  ∈  we have (−) ≥ (0
−) − [(0) − ()] Since  is independent
of  this inequality is not enough to characterize the Groves mechanisms that satisfy solidarity.W eh a v e
the following result:
18Lemma 4. A Groves mechanism  satisﬁes solidarity if and only if for each 0 ⊆  each pair
{0} ⊂ C such that 0
0 ≥ 0 and 0
\0 = \0 and each  ∈ 
(−) ≥ (0
−) (16)
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :
Let  ∈ H be as in (16). Let 0 ⊆  {0} ⊂ C be such that 0
0 ≥ 0 and 0
\0 = \0,a n d ∈ 
Since (0) ≥ () by (2) and (16), (();) ≥ ((0);0
) Hence,  satisﬁes solidarity.
Conversely, let  satisfy solidarity.
Now, assume, by contradiction to (16), that there is 0 ⊆  {0} ⊂ C such that 0
0 ≥ 0 and
0
\0 = \0 and  ∈  for which
(−)  (0
−) (17)
If there is no  ∈ 0 such that  6=  and 0
   then − = 0
− which contradicts (17). Hence, let  6= 
be such that 0
   Let b  be constructed as in (11). Let b  =( b  −) and b  0 =( b  0
−) By Lemma 3,
{b b  0} ⊂ C Note that b 0
0 ≥ b 0 and b 0
\0 = b \0 Since b − = − and b  0
− = 0
−, by (17),
(b −)  (b  0
−) (18)




()} Hence, (b )=(b  0)=b (A) These equalities, solidarity, and Equation (2) together
imply (b −) ≥ (b  0
−) which contradicts (18) ¥
Order preservation compares the utilities of two agents according to the costs they incur. If a Groves
mechanism  preserves order,t h e nb y( 2 ) ,f o re a c hp a i r{} ⊆  and each  ∈ C such that  ≥ 
(−) ≤ (−)
However, for Groves mechanisms, order preservation has further implications. Firstly, if the costs of
some of the agents increase in an economy, then for any agent, the part of her transfer that is independent
of her costs also weakly increases. Secondly, order preserving Groves mechanisms are invariant with respect
to the relabeling of the agents within each population (anonymity).
Anonymity: For each bijection  :  →  each  ∈  and each  ∈ C ()=()((())∈)
Lemma 5. A Groves mechanism  preserves order if and only if it is anonymous and for each 0 ⊆ 
each pair {0} ⊂ C such that 0
0 ≥ 0 and 0
\0 = \0 and each  ∈ 
(0
−) ≥ (−) (19)
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :
Let  be anonymous and  ∈ H be as in (19). By anonymity,t h e r ei s : C → R such that for each
 ∈   =  Assume, by contradiction, that  does not preserve order. Then, there are {} ⊆ 
and  ∈ C such that  ≥  and (

 ();)  (

 ();) This inequality and (2) together imply
(−)  (−) (20)
Let 0 ∈ C be such that 0
 =  and 0
− = −  Hence, by anonymity,( I )(0
−)=(−) Since
0
 ≥  and 0
\{} = \{} taking 0 = {} by (19), (0
−) ≥ (−) This inequality and (I) together
imply (−) ≥ (−), which contradicts (20). Hence,  preserves order.
Conversely, let  be an order preserving Groves mechanism. By Proposition 3 in Yengin (2010),  is
anonymous. Hence, there is  : C → R such that for each  ∈   =  Assume, by contradiction to
(19), that there are 0 ⊆  {0} ⊂ C such that 0
0 ≥ 0 and 0
\0 = \0 and  ∈  such that
(−)  (0
−) (21)
19Let |0| = 0 By anonymity, we can assume that  is as follows:  = ; if  ∈ 0 then for each 1 ≤  ≤ 0
 ∈ 0; and if  ∈ 0 then for each 1 ≤  ≤ 0 − 1∈ 0





















 )=( 1 2−1;0
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− ) Since this inequality is true for each  ∈ 0\{} by the transitivity of ≥
(
(0)
− ) ≥ (
(0)
−) if  ∈ 0; (24)
(
(0−1)
− ) ≥ (
(0)
−) if  ∈ 0 (25)
Note that 
(0)
− = −;a n di f ∈ 0 then 
(0)
− = 0




(24), and (25) together imply (0
−) ≥ (−)Since  =  this inequality contradicts (21). ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :
By Lemma 1, an assignment-eﬃcient, strategy-proof,a n dwelfare-egalitarian mechanism belongs to E By
Lemmas 4 and 5, mechanisms in E satisfy solidarity and order preservation.
Conversely, pick an assignment-eﬃcient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisﬁes order preservation
and solidarity. By Lemma 2, this mechanism is a Groves mechanism  for some  ∈ H and  ∈ T 
Let {0} ⊂ C For each  ∈  let b  be as in (11) Let b  =( b )∈ ∈ C By Lemma 3, b  ∈ C Note
that b  ≤  and b  ≤ 0
By Lemma 5, there is  : C → R such that for each  ∈   =  and (b −) ≤ (−) and
(b −) ≤ (0
−)
By Lemma 4, for each  ∈  (b −) ≥ (−) and (b −) ≥ (0
−)
Altogether, (I) for each  ∈  (b −)=(−)=(0
−) Note that, by (11), for each pair {} ⊆ 
b  = b  Hence, by anonymity,( I I )f o re a c hp a i r{} ⊆  (b −)=(b −) By (I) and (II), for each
pair {0} ⊂ C and each pair {} ⊆  (−)=(0
−) In other words, there is  ∈ R such that
 =  Hence,  is welfare-egalitarian. ¥
Proof of Corollary 1:
(i) Follows from Theorem 1 and the facts that mechanisms in E are also egalitarian-equivalent and every
egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism preserves order. To see the later part, let  be an egalitarian-
equivalent Groves mechanism. By (2), a Groves mechanism  is egalitarian-equivalent if and only if for
each  ∈ C there exist a reference transfer () ∈ R and a reference set of tasks () ∈ 2A such that for
each  ∈  (I) (−)=()+() − (()) Let {} ⊆  and  ∈ C be such that  ≥  By (I),
(−) ≥ (−) By (2),  preserves order.
(ii) Follows from Theorem 1 and the facts that on the subadditive domain, mechanisms in E are envy-free
and every envy-free Groves mechanism preserves order. The second fact follows from Proposition 3iv in
Yengin (2010).
20Now, we show that on the subadditive domain, welfare egalitarianism implies no-envy. This will prove that
mechanisms in E are also envy-free on the subadditive domain.
Let  ≡ () be a welfare-egalitarian mechanism. Assume, by contradiction, that  is not envy-free on
the subadditive domain. Then, there are  ∈ C
 and {} ⊆  such that (();)  (();)
That is, (I) −(()) + ()  −(()) + () By welfare-egalitarianism, (II) −(()) + ()=
−(())+() By (I) and (II), −(())+()  −(())+() That is, (())  (())
This inequality implies that () 6= ∅ and since  is subadditive, we have
(() ∪ ()) ≤ (()) + (())  (()) + (())
Then it would be less costly than () if  was assigned (() ∪ ()) and  was assigned no task
which contradicts that () is an eﬃcient assignment. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :

















[1])  satisﬁes -bounded-deﬁcit.
Conversely, let  be an Egalitarian mechanism that satisﬁes -bounded-deﬁcit Then,  ∈ E for

































the right-hand-side of (26) is 0 and  ≤ 0
b) Let  be a Groves mechanism that satisﬁes solidarity, order-preservation,a n d-bounded-deﬁcit.
By Theorem 1 and Proposition 1a,  ∈ E for some  ≤ 0
By (2), for each  ∈  and each  ∈ C, (

 ();)=−()+ Since utility is increasing in  
Pareto-dominates all Egalitarian mechanisms that satisfy -bounded-deﬁcit i fa n do n l yi f =0  That is,
 ∈ E0





 ()=(  − 1)() −  Since the surplus is minimal
i fa n do n l yi f is maximal,  generates the minimal surplus among all Egalitarian mechanisms that
satisfy -bounded-deﬁcit i fa n do n l yi f ∈ E0 ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Let  ∈ M
a) Let  ∈ R≤ 





 ()=−(−1)()+ Since  ≥− (−1)
and  ≥   satisﬁes -bounded-deﬁcit.
Conversely, let  be an Egalitarian mechanism that satisﬁes -bounded-deﬁcit Then,  ∈ E for





 ()=−( − 1)()+ ≤ ()+
That is, for each  ∈ C ≤
[+(−1)]
 ()+
 Since this inequality is true for any  ∈ C and also
 +(  − 1) ≥ 0
 ≤
[ +(  − 1)]

min
∈C{()} +  (27)
21Note that min
∈C{()} = (0)=0  Hence, by (27)≤ 

b) We omit the proof since it is parallel to the proof of Proposition 1b. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
a) Let  ∈ H be as in (5). Then, by (2), for each  ∈  and each  ∈ C, (

 ();) ≥− (A)+ ≥
−(A)+ Hence,  satisﬁes −compensation lower-bound.
Conversely, let  respect −compensation lower-bound. Assume, by contradiction, that there are  ∈ 
and  ∈ C such that
(−)   (28)
Let 0 =( 0








− = − (−) ≥  which contradicts (28).




 ()=−( − 1)()+
P
∈




is minimal. Hence, by (5),  generates the minimal deﬁcit among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy
−compensation lower-bound i fa n do n l yi f ∈ E ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :
Let  ∈ M with  = 
Let  ∈ E. Then, by (2), for each  ∈  and each  ∈ C, (

 ();)=−()+ Since () ≤






 ≥− ( − 1)  satisﬁes -bounded-deﬁcit
Conversely, let  be a Groves mechanism that satisﬁes −compensation lower-bound and -bounded-
deﬁcit. Assume, by contradiction, that   ∈ E. Then, by (5), there are  ∈  and  ∈ C such
that (−)  Let 0 =( 0
 −) Since 0
− = − we have (0
−)=(−)  Then, by (5), P
∈
(0
−)   This inequality and -bounded-deﬁcit together imply














(A)=0  then (29) implies    which contradicts the fact that  = . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
Let  ∈ M
a) Let  ∈ R≤ 









−( − 1)()+ Since  ≥− ( − 1) and  ≥   satisﬁes -bounded-deﬁcit.
Conversely, let  be a Groves mechanism that satisﬁes solidarity and unanimity. Hence, there is  ∈ R






−( − 1)(0)+ ≤ (0)+ This inequality and (0)=0together imply  ≤ 

b) Let  be a Groves mechanism that satisﬁes solidarity, unanimity,a n d-bounded-deﬁcit.
By Proposition 4a,  ∈ U for some  ≤ 
 For each  ∈  and each  ∈ C by (2),
(

 ();)=−()+(−) Since utility is increasing in (−) and by (6), (−) ≤ 
22 Pareto-dominates all Groves mechanism that satisﬁes solidarity, unanimity,a n d-bounded-
deﬁcit i fa n do n l yi ff o re a c h ∈  and each  ∈ C (−)= = 
 That is,  ∈ E

 ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
Let  ≡ () be a mechanism that satisﬁes (8).
Let  be Pareto-eﬃcient and welfare-egalitarian. By Pareto-eﬃciency, for each  ∈ C,( 8 )h o l d sa sa n
equality. Hence, for each  ∈ C X
∈
[() − (())] = 0 (30)
By welfare-egalitarianism,f o re a c h ∈ C,t h e r ei s() ∈ R such that for each  ∈ 
(();)=−(()) + ()=()
This equality and (30) together imply
P
∈
()=()=0  That is, for each  ∈ C and each  ∈ 
(();)=0 . Hence,  satisﬁes solidarity and unanimity.
Conversely, let  be a Pareto-eﬃcient mechanism that satisﬁes solidarity and unanimity. Let  ∈ C
Since costs are unbounded above, there is 0 ∈ C such that 0 and for each pair {} ⊆  0
 = 0

By unanimity, there are (0) ∈ R and (0) ∈ R such that for each  ∈  ((0);0
)=(0) and
((0);0






(0)=0  Hence, (0)=(0)=0 
Since 0 ≤  0 by solidarity, for each  ∈  ((0);0
) ≥ (();) ≥ ((0);) For each  ∈ 
since ((0);0
)=((0);0
)=0  we have (();)=0  Hence,  is welfare-egalitarian. ¥
7 References
Atlamaz M, Yengin D (2008): Fair Groves mechanisms. Social Choice and Welfare 31:573—587.
Chen MA and Maskin E.S (1999): Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments. Journal of
Economic Theory 89:140-147.
Chun Y (2006): No-envy in queueing problems. Economic Theory 29:151-162.
Clarke EH (1971): Multi-part pricing of public goods. Public choice 11:17-33.
Fleurbaey M, Maniquet F (1999): Cooperative production with unequal skills: the solidarity approach to compensation.
Social Choice and Welfare 16:569-583.
Foley D (1967): Resource allocation and public sector. Yale Economic Essays 7:45-98.
Gibbard A (1973): Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 41: 587-601.
Ginés M, Marhuenda F (2000): Welfarism in economic domains. Journal of Economic Theory 93:191-204.
Groves T (1973): Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41:617-631.
Holmström B (1979): Groves’ scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica 47:1137-1144.
Kalai E (1977): Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparison. Econometrica.
45:1623-1630.
Moulin H, Roemer J (1989): Public ownership of external world and private ownership of self. Journal of Political Economy.
97:347-367.
Moreno-Ternero J, Roemer J (2006): Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice. Econometrica
74:1419-1427.
Nozick R (1974): Anarchy, state, and utopia. Basic Books, New York.
Ohseto S. (2006) “Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods” Economic Theory
29, 111-121.
Pápai S (2003): Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices. Social Choice and Welfare 20:371-385.
23Pazner A, Schmeidler D (1978): Egalitarian equivalent allocations: A new concept of economic equity. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 92:671-687.
Porter, R., Shoham, Y. and Tennenholtz, M. (2004): Fair imposition. Journal of Economic Theory 118:209—228.
Satterthwaite M (1975): Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting
procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10:187-217.
Roemer J (1986): Equality of resources implies equality of welfare. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101:751-784.
Serizawa S. Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rule by Anonymity. Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
Sprumont Y (1996): Axiomatic ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary. Journal of Economic Theory
68:77-110.
Thomson W (1983): Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution. Journal of Economic Theory 31:211-226.
Vickrey W (1961): Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitively sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16:8-37.
Yengin D (2010): Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogenous objects. Social Choice and
Welfare, forthcoming.
Yengin D (2011a): Equivalence of No-envy and Egalitarian-equivalence with Welfare-egalitarianism: Axiomatizing Political
Philosophy of Distributive Justice. University of Adelaide, School of Economics Working Papers number 2011-19
Yengin D (2011b): Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY problems. Journal
of Public Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Yengin D (2011c): Welfare Bounds in a Growing Population. Unpublished Manuscript.
24